When you close your eyes how do you see threats?
In today’s world, the concept of national security should be
a primary goal of our government. As you will see from my research that
national security today generally does not even look at ideologies that
conflict with the Constitution of the United States of America.
Most of the threats to national security have come from
persons who have undergone extensive background checks, or from persons who
were somehow able to skip the process of a background check. Thus, the big problem we face today is coming
from Insider Threats.
Today we
have known actors from agencies affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and
other networks affiliated with acts of terror making appointments to with the
State Department and the Intelligence Community because the Muslim Brotherhood
has yet to be declared a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
 |
| Former DCI James Woolsey |
In the not
very distant past, limitations were held against persons holding the ideology
of Communism. Several foreign actors, a.k.a. spies were discovered during and
shortly after the Cold War that had gained access to documents through their
government positions. According to Feldman (2003), former CIA Director Woolsey
once stated that we are currently in World War IV. Feldman observed that Wolsey
considered the Cold War, World War III. World War IV is the war against Islamic
terrorism. If Woolsey was correct in 2003, then it is
essential to recognize this war as a war of ideological differences. Which
could and should be essential to identifying possible insider threats.
A.
Definitions: What is an Insider Threat?
Stockton and Olson (2013) wrote in their independent review
of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting provided the official Department of
Defense definition of Insider Threat taken from an Executive Order by President
Obama in October 2011:
The threat that an insider will use
her/his authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security
of the United States. This threat can include damage to the United States
through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security
information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or
capabilities. (p. 59)
Executive Order 13587 empowered the
Attorney General and the National Director of Intelligence to form an Insider
Threat Task Force. These orders expanded outward and now nearly every Federal
agency has an insider threat program.
1.
Definitions to program specifics
Wallace and Lofti (2014) provided an example of how an
Insider Threat definition can be made department specific when they quote the TSA
definition as “one or more individuals with access or insider knowledge that
allows them to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Nation’s transportation
systems with the intent to cause harm” (p.291).
B.
Threat Examples
Wallace and Lofti (2014) discussed Insider threats to
aviation. In doing so, they provide good examples that are seemingly glanced
over for an element known as ideology. One example given is that of Terry
Loewen, a 58 year old avionics technician, who was arrested on federal
terrorism charges after 5 months of undercover work by the FBI (p. 291). In the
article Terry Loewen, uses his inside access and knowledge to plan and execute
an attack. He also expresses a desire to “engage in violent jihad on behalf of
Al Qaeda” (p. 291). Wallace and Lofti also cite the example of an Insider
threat to British Airways, Rajib Karim, who plotted in 2010 with Anwar
al-Awlaki to destroy a flight (pgs. 290-291). Lofti and Wallace’s qualitative
study was to examine what aviation personnel perceive as security threats
presented from vetted and credentialed employees. They note that three of their
six subjects were familiar with cases of past Insider threats such as Loewen
and Karim. Three out of the six interviewed identified difficulties in catching
a “lone-wolf terrorist” (p.297) Yet, not one discussion is written about the
possible impact of ideology, however in two out four examples given on the
topic of Insider Threats, the perpetrators had an Islamist ideology.
Amy Zegart (2015) stated that “in the past five years,
trusted US military and intelligence insiders have been responsible for the
Wikileaks publication of thousands of classified reports, the worst
intelligence breach of in National Security Agency history, the deaths of a
dozen Navy, civilians and, contractors
at the Washington Navy Yard, and two attacks at Fort Hood that killed sixteen
people and injured more than fifty” (p. 35).
Zegart posited of the 2009 Fort Hood attack attack listing
the issues attributed to not catching and stopping Hasan’s attack. “To date,
the 2009 Fort Hood attack has been attributed mostly to leadership failures,
poor policy guidance, and political correctness regarding disciplining or
investigating a Muslim-American in the military” (p. 36).
Zegart provides research on organizational
theory and disasters to explain why the Army failed to prevent Hasan’s 2009
attack. She also states that evidence existed of the threat of what Hasan could
do, as there existed evidence of the attack on Pearl Harbor. She points out
that there is an organizational failure when there is not a “central
coordinating mechanism” (p. 36). Zegart claims part of the reason for this is
because of “’noise’ of false leads, irrelevant information and deception” (pp.
36-37).
Zegart does not disregard the importance
of the known ideology of Hasan. In fact she emphasizes it in her discussion on
Disincentives in the Disciplinary System. She notes that Hasan statements that
his loyalty to the Koran took precedence over loyalty to the Constitution, and
that this alone should have been sufficient grounds for a discharge (p. 40).
 |
| Abdul Rahman al-Amoudi |
Patrick Poole (2013) wrote of missed
Insider Threats such as Abdul Rahman al-Amoudi. He demonstrates that his
Islamist (Islamic supremacist) views were not only widely known by the FBI, but
that al-Amoudi’s support of groups that were recognized by the United States as
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) was also known (p.3). Poole points out
that al-Amoudi’s ideological views and support of terrorism was exposed in the
Wall Street Journal by journalist Steven Emerson as early as 1996. Yet
al-Amoudi somehow was granted access to Presidents and numerous others. On top
of this his organization was granted the power to certify Muslim military
chaplains.
Poole also noted in his work
Shaykh Kifah
Mustapha received a tour of the National Counterterrorism Center, a top-secret
facility as part of the FBI’s Citizen Academy civilian training program. In
September 2010. This brings into question whether students that have access can
be considered Insider Threats. Returning to the definition, it clearly includes
all persons who have authorized access to persons or materials. Only three
years prior Mustapha was named an unindicted co-conspirator in the largest
terrorism financing trial in America’s history, where evidence was presented of
his affinity towards Hamas.
 |
| Shaykh Kifah Mustapha |
DATA COLLECTION
Data
was collected from 13 federal departments including accessible information on
military and civilian training on Insider Threats were reviewed. Private
company materials claiming affiliation with the Department of Defense (DoD)
were also reviewed when possible. Materials were discovered through a basic
search on USA.gov which provided links to federal departments and their
training materials.
Certain
materials were discovered to be used across a wider platform of use than
specific to a department or agency. Training materials created by the Center
for Development of Security Excellence were discovered to have been recommended
to civilian contractors. CDSE is listed on the federal database however it is
not a department of the federal government. With that said, all of the contact
information is routed through a .mil database. The CDSE (n.d.) Mission
Statement and Vision revealed that it claims to be “a nationally accredited,
award-winning directorate within the Defense Security Service (DSS),” with an
addition claim that it provides “the DoD with a security center of excellence
for the professionalization of the security community.”
DATA ANALYSIS
All
program training materials reviewed on Insider Threats were found to not
discuss or present any information on ideological indicators, with the
exception of the Army’s training materials. NCIS did not rank as high as the
Army on this topic because NCIS training materials on Insider Threats are
taught as a component of their Counter-Intelligence program and appears not to
be taught separate from this topic. Because it is not taught separate trainees
are taught Possible Espionage Indicators that examine ideology.
The
Center for Development of Security Excellence created an extensive training
material component complete with video, handouts and more. CDSE does not
include Ideological Indicators, unless they include a component on Possible
Espionage Indicators (PEIs). If this component is missing in training, ideology
as an indicator of possible Insider Threat is not covered at all.
No
discovery was made of any training or policy materials that provided specific
indicators that would could create a discussion on Ideological Indicators for
Islamic Terrorism. This is of interest, since persons claiming to Muslim have committed
the majority of terrorist actions. However, in the CDSE training, one case is
presented that could allow such a discussion. However the CDSE training
material discusses only nationalism as a possible PEI.
The
following federal agencies and departments and federal contractors are missing
any mention of ideology as an indicator of Insider Threat from the available
resources found through USA.gov.
·
Department of Homeland Security
·
DHS: National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center
·
DHS: Science and Technology Directorate
·
Department of Energy
·
Information Systems Security Awareness
·
Government Accountability Office (Training
materials not found but reports indicate an absence of knowledge in this area.)
·
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers
and Studies
·
Defense Security Service
·
US Department of Agriculture
·
Department of Defense
·
Department of Transportation (TSA)
·
Sandia National Laboratories (Listed
government contractor)
POSSIBLE
INSIDER THREAT DISCOVERED
Sandia
National Laboratories (SNL), has posted on its site (Sandia National
Laboratories, 2017) an interaction with a mosque that is affiliated with the
Muslim Brotherhood. This information was indicated by the mosque on its own
site (ICNM, 2015). The mosque claimed: “ICNM
is affiliated with Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and all associated
properties are under the umbrella of North American Islamic Trust (NAIT)”
(ICNM, 2015). Both ISNA and NAIT have been recognized in federal court as
unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundation Trial in 2008 (King,
2017). In the article (Sandia
National Laboratories, 2017),
Mohamed
Ebeida of Sandia National Laboratories is credited with having created a bond
between both SNL and the Islamic Center of New Mexico when he formed a Robotics
team of Muslim teens sponsored by Sandia National
Laboratories, which is based out of ICNM. Mr. Ebeida may or may not be aware of the
problem this poses. This is why the federal definition of Insider Threats
indicates a person may “wittingly or unwittingly” commit an action that may be
deemed as a threat.
Malone (2015) wrote about numerous
security breaches at Sandia Labs. Missing materials. When the article was
published it observed that the private organization that ran the lab was being
fined “$577,500 for its poor handling of classified nuclear bomb design
information.” Private companies running federal programs may not grasp the
importance on national security and/or they may not have a desire to spend what
is needed of their profit margin in order to maintain national security at the
labs. As stated in the observed possible
Insider Threat above, the information is public knowledge. Anyone with a
computer can find this link.
CONCLUSION
The
absence of ideological indicators of Insider Threats specifically allows for three
possible dangers regarding Insider Threats. It is also noticeable that no
discussion of Ideological indicators specific to Islamic terrorism further
places America at risk.
1)
The hiring of personnel without examining
ideology, may later allow persons to be act themselves or, be used to promote a
threat to the country (Wallace and Lofti, 2014).
2)
Granting security clearances to persons
whose ideology may not agree with the Constitution may create an opening to
revealing classified information to persons who consider themselves an enemy of
the United States of America.
3)
Granting access to secure locations to
persons whose ideology does not agree with the Constitution places Americans at
risk.
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